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The Ideals of the Rule of Law 
 
James A. Grant* 
 
Abstract: Choices that are underdetermined by reason, such as choices arising 
from incommensurability among values, involve an element of arbitrariness, and 
arbitrary choices are commonly thought to be inimical to the rule of law. In this 
article, I suggest that we should distinguish between two different ideals of the 
rule of law, and that the arbitrariness of some judicial choices has different 
implications for these different ideals. One ideal of the rule of law can be 
understood as ‘the rule of authority’, and the other ideal can be understood as 
‘the rule of reason’. The latter ideal is opposed to decisions that lack reason, but 
not to arbitrary choices between undefeated reasons. The arbitrariness involved 
in choosing between undefeated reasons may be a deficit in one ideal of the rule 
of law (the rule of authority), but not a deficit in the other ideal (the rule of 
reason). Moreover, it is important to recognise that these are distinct ideals that 
can conflict, and not rival interpretations of a single ideal.  
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The rule of law is usually contrasted with the rule of persons. Since the law can 
only rule through persons, this is usually taken to mean that the rule of law is 
opposed to the arbitrary power of persons. In Albert Venn Dicey’s oft-cited 
formulation, the rule of law stands against ‘the exercise by persons in authority 
of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint’.1 In this article, I want 
to consider the question: is the arbitrariness entailed by rationally 
underdetermined decision-making contrary to the ideal of the rule of law? I will 
suggest that the rule of law contains many ideals, which are structured by two 
distinct, overarching ideals, and that these two ideals have different 
consequences for rationally underdetermined judicial choices, such as choices 
among incommensurable options. The rule of law is best understood as being 
opposed to decisions that are unconstrained by law, but not necessarily to 
decisions that are arbitrary. 
The two ideals of the rule of law can be termed, for brevity, the rule of 
authority and the rule of reason. According to one ideal, which is the dominant 
one among modern legal theorists, the rule of law is presented in the image of 
authority, the image of existing legal rules constraining the decisions of officials, 
including judges. It entails that an official’s decision should be able to be 
justified by the application of an existing, authoritative legal rule, without that 
                                                 
1 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, 
Macmillan 1964) 188. 
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official having to make a further choice or discretionary judgment. The pursuit of 
this ideal therefore requires the creation of authoritative legal sources capable of 
fulfilling the role of justifying the official’s decisions. This is where the familiar 
requirements of this ideal of the rule of law are significant. These requirements 
are designed to ensure that the authoritative legal rule is capable of ruling, that it 
is clear, prospective, general, relatively stable and so forth. From this 
perspective, arbitrary choice is a problem to which the solution is the creation of 
authoritative legal sources, sources which can provide a determinate answer and 
prevent the need for an arbitrary choice in the future. That is not to say that 
arbitrariness is necessarily contrary to this ideal of the rule of law. Not every 
decision ought to be ruled by the law’s authoritative rules. So an arbitrary choice 
will be contrary to the rule of law only if it ought to be ruled by law. But the very 
arbitrariness of the choice may well be one reason why it ought to be ruled by 
law. 
According to the other ideal, far from being opposed to arbitrariness, the 
rule of law will often result in arbitrariness. The rule of law is captured in the 
image of reason—as Edward Coke put it, the common law ‘is nothing else but 
Reason’—and so the meaning of ‘constrained by law’ is drastically altered.2 In 
this sense, the rule of law is the rule of reason and the ideal requires official 
decisions to be constrained by reason, rather than merely constrained by 
antecedent legal rules. When reason leaves a choice that is underdetermined by 
                                                 
2 Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; or a Commentary upon 
Littleton (first published 1928, Francis Hargrave and Charles Butler eds, 15th edn, 1794) 97b. 
See also TRS Allan, ‘The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism’ 
(1999) 115 LQR 221. 
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reason, and is therefore arbitrary, it might be thought that such a choice is 
contrary to the rule of law. But such a view rests on a misunderstanding of the 
nature of rationally underdetermined choices. These choices are compatible with 
the rule of reason, because, although arbitrary, they are also reasonable, that is, 
not contrary to reason. These choices are not a problem for the rule of reason, 
even though they may be a problem for the ideal of the rule of law in the sense of 
the rule of authority. 
Before exploring these two ideals of the rule of law in more detail, some 
further preliminary clarifications are necessary. First, although I call these two 
distinct ideals, it is also important to understand that the rule of authority in a 
sense derives from the rule of reason. When it is legitimately called for, 
adherence to authority is a requirement of reason. In this way, the rule of reason 
will often require the rule of authority. But I call them two distinct ideals—or 
distinct aspects of the rule of law—to emphasise that they may require different 
things, pulling in opposite directions. That is to say, the requirement of 
adherence to legitimate authority may conflict with other requirements of reason. 
To the extent that the two ideals conflict, it is a conflict within the rule of reason. 
My claim, then, is that the rule of authority is a distinct ideal within the broader 
ideal of the rule of reason. 
Secondly, there has been much academic debate on the question of how 
the rule of law is related to the concept of law, and whether the concept of law 
determines the rule of law or vice versa.3 I would like to bracket this 
                                                 
3 cf Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ in his The Authority of Law: Essays on Law 
and Morality (OUP 1979) 223–24; Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 
43 Ga L Rev 1, 11. One common view is that when a purported law is very deficient in the 
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jurisprudential debate about how the rule of law is linked to the concept of law. 
While my argument may presuppose that law can be viewed as authority and as 
reason, we could just as well leave out the label ‘law’ and instead simply refer to 
the rule of authority and the rule of reason. My main concern here is with the 
underlying values; I am not so concerned with what we call those values. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that different ideals of the rule of law are 
sometimes presented as rival conceptions of an essentially contested concept.4 
This is not what I mean by different ideals of the rule of law. It is better, in my 
view, to understand the two ideals of the rule of law as aspects of the rule of law, 
not as contested ways of interpreting or understanding it. Relatedly, a fourth 
point that needs clarifying is how my argument relates to other presentations of 
different ideals of the rule of law. There are obvious parallels, but also as we 
shall see important differences, between the distinction that I draw in this article 
and the distinction that Paul Craig draws, in his influential essay, between formal 
and substantive conceptions of the rule of law.5 One problem with other accounts 
                                                 
requirements of the rule of law, it is not law, or at least it is not a central case of law: see Lon L 
Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. edn, Yale UP 1969); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights (first published 1980, 2nd edn, OUP 2011). 
4 On the idea of essentially contested concepts, see WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ 
(1955–56) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167. On the application of this idea to the 
rule of law, see Richard Fallon, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ 
(1997) 97 Columbia L Rev 1, 6; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested 
Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law and Philosophy 137, 148–53. cf John Gray, ‘Political 
Power, Social Theory, and Essential Contestability’ in David Miller and Larry Siedentop (eds), 
The Nature of Political Theory (Clarendon Press 1983). 
5 Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework’ [1997] PL 467, 467. It has been said that the formal side of the ideal is better 
described as procedural rather than formal: John Gardner, ‘On the Supposed Formality of the 
Rule of Law’ in John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (OUP 2012) 
198–204. On the other hand, it has been said that the rule of law is best understood as having two 
aspects, one formal and the other procedural: Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (n 4) 
7. 
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of the rule of law that draw a similar distinction to the one that I am drawing is 
that they either treat them as rival conceptions that we must choose between or 
else they go on to suggest that these ideals are in harmony with one another. In 
my view, it is important to recognise the tension between the two ideals of the 
rule of law. 
Finally, let me briefly explain what I mean by choices that are 
underdetermined by reason, such as choices among incommensurable options. 
When two options are of incommensurable value, we cannot say that one option 
is better than another or that they are of equal value.6 There are undefeated 
reasons for each option but no conclusive reason that makes it right to choose 
one option over the other. It is reasonable to choose either way,7 but the choice, 
although reasonable, is also arbitrary. Incommensurability among values is not 
the only feature of life that can make it reasonable to choose either way. 
Vagueness, uncertainty, and the equality, or rough equality, of the options all 
give rise to similar choices. Each of these is different, but they have one 
important thing in common: they all entail a range of reasonable decisions, with 
no uniquely correct answer within that range. The result is that an arbitrary 
choice has to be made. The choice will not necessarily be random (it might in 
fact be quite predictable how someone will decide), but it will be arbitrary in the 
                                                 
6 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986) 322. On the incommensurability 
thesis, see also John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980); Ruth 
Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard UP 1997); 
Symposium, ‘Law and Incommensurability’ (1998) 146 U Penn L Rev 1169. 
7 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (n 9) 339: ‘[r]ational action is action for (what the agent takes to 
be) an undefeated reason. It is not necessarily action for a reason which defeats all others.’ 
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sense that it is not required by reason.8 It is also worth noting that none of these 
types of indeterminacy is a species of relativism. When I talk about requirements 
of reason, I will be referring to what philosophers commonly call ‘right reason’, 
a non-relativist concept of reason, meaning what one really ought to do.9 My 
claim is that right reason can sometimes leave us with more than one right 
answer. 
In this essay, it will not be possible to defend this incommensurability 
thesis against its critics, such as Ronald Dworkin, who argue that values are 
integrated and unified through interpretation, and that for this reason there ‘are 
no genuine conflicts of values’.10 Suffice it to say that I do not find these claims 
convincing, but they nonetheless contain a kernel of good sense. It is all too easy 
to fall into the trap of ‘lazy pluralism’,11 pointing out conflicts between abstract 
values. Values need to be concretised or interpreted to determine what they 
actually require in particular circumstances, and this concretisation can often 
reveal options that are compatible. But I think we should also recognise that 
some valuable options remain in conflict, possibly giving rise to 
                                                 
8 If a judge makes this arbitrary choice, the loser who accepts that the claims were 
incommensurable would also accept that there was no right answer (no reason that justifies the 
choice of one over the other), despite his or her preference for one over the other. Of course, on 
the other hand, if the loser thinks the options were commensurable, he or she will think the 
judge’s decision was wrong. 
9 See eg John Finnis, ‘Natural Law and Legal Reasoning’ in Robert P George (ed), Natural Law 
Theory: Contemporary Essays (OUP 1994) 137: ‘Aristotle’s phrase orthos logos and his later 
followers’ recta ratio, right reason, should simply be understood as “unfettered reason,” reason 
undeflected by emotions and feelings.’ 
10 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Belknap Press 2011) 101, 119. 
11 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs (2013) NYU School of Law, Public Law, & 
Legal Theory Research Paper 13–45, 5, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290309> accessed 10 September 2015. 
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incommensurability, even when fully concretised. That, at least, is the 
assumption on which this essay’s discussion of the rule of law will proceed. 
 
2. The Rule of Authority 
 
From Thomas Aquinas to Jeremy Bentham to, among modern theorists, Lon 
Fuller, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, and John Finnis, many theorists have associated 
the ideal of the rule of law with the guidance of conduct. On this account, the 
ideal requires the law to guide conduct through its antecedent, authoritative rules. 
The notion that, if the law is to rule and be obeyed, it must be capable of guiding 
behaviour is, according to Raz, ‘the basic intuition from which the doctrine of 
the rule of law derives’.12 This ideal of the rule of law, which Raz described as a 
formal one, is said to contain a number of requirements that aim to ensure that 
the law is capable of ruling. Among these theorists, there is, perhaps 
surprisingly, general agreement on the content of the rule of law’s requirements. 
Most of the requirements are concerned with ensuring that the law is general, 
open, prospective, clear, stable, non-contradictory, and complied with or capable 
of being complied with.13 However, despite this general agreement on the 
content of the ideal’s requirements, there is much less agreement on its value. Is 
the rule of law based on moral values? If so, what moral values justify it? 
                                                 
12 Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (n 4) 214. 
13 See Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 4) 46–94; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard UP 
1971) 235–43; Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (n 4) 214–19; Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (n 4) 270. 
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One way of understanding the rule of law is to view it as merely an 
instrumental value. Raz has been especially prominent in articulating this 
understanding. The rule of law, he argued, is the ‘inherent or specific virtue’ of 
law, in the same way as a knife’s sharpness, its ability to cut, is the inherent or 
specific virtue of a knife. In both cases, the inherent virtue is an instrumental 
value: it can be used for bad ends as well as for good.14 Raz also argued that this 
instrumental value is a ‘negative virtue’, which is designed to minimise the 
danger of arbitrary power that the law itself creates.15 These arguments lead Raz 
to conclude that ‘the rule of law is an inherent virtue of the law, but not a moral 
virtue as such’, although he adds that the rule of law ‘is virtually always of great 
moral value.’16 The reduction in arbitrary power that comes with conformity 
with the rule of law will have moral value only if the law that is being made less 
arbitrary is in pursuit of good ends. Just as the sharpness of a knife does not have 
moral value if the knife is used as a murder weapon, so the law’s conformity 
with the requirements of the rule of law does not have moral value if it is used 
for immoral ends. That is the crux of Raz’s argument. 
Other theorists, however, have disputed the argument that the rule of law 
is merely a means to other ends. Especially notable is Fuller’s argument that, in 
addition to being a means to other ends, law is also an end in itself. The end that 
he identifies is ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
                                                 
14 Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (n 4) 225. 
15 ibid 224. 
16 ibid 226. 
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rules’.17 Although the subjection of human conduct to the governance of rules is 
a distinctive purpose of law, because other enterprises, besides law, can have that 
purpose, Fuller was surely right to say that it was one of the purposes of the rule 
of law, albeit not a distinctive one. But is this purpose really a moral ideal, an 
end in itself? In doubting this, HLA Hart argued that the rule of law could be 
regarded as a moral ideal ‘[o]nly if the purpose of subjecting human conduct to 
the governance of rules, no matter what their content, were itself … an ultimate 
value’.18 That would be to mistake the means for the end, ‘a classic legalist 
mistake’, according to John Gardner.19 Playing by the rules is of moral value 
only if the ends are worth pursuing. The moral value of the rule of law, in other 
words, seems to be dependent on the moral value of the ends that the law 
pursues.  
It might be thought that a value pluralist would be drawn to Fuller’s 
argument, since a value pluralist is in the business of explaining that there is a 
plurality of values, and so might be expected to argue that the rule of law is an 
end in itself, or ‘ultimate value’, as well as a means to other ends. Yet it is not 
clear what could explain that value. If it is not the subjecting of human conduct 
to the governance of rules that explains its value, one possible explanation is that 
it promotes freedom under the law. According to some, liberty is a good example 
of a value that is both ultimate and a means to other ends. We value liberty (as an 
                                                 
17 Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 4) 96. 
18 HLA Hart, ‘Book Review’ (1965) 78 Harv L Rev 1281, 1287. 
19 Gardner, ‘On the Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law’ (n 8) 212. 
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end) from certain interferences, and we value liberty (as a means) to pursue other 
ends.20 On this view, just as there is some value in liberty just qua liberty, so 
there is some value in following legal rules just qua legal rules. But these values 
may be outweighed by other values. It is not the case that we have liberty to do 
anything we want: the ideal of liberty has to take some account of the ends that 
we should be at liberty to pursue.21 In the case of evil or pointless laws, the value 
in following the law may be outweighed to such an extent that it seems as if it 
has no value at all. For in these cases what would the rule of law add? Is the 
thought that it gives evil laws some redeeming quality: that the law may be evil, 
but at least it is clearly evil? 
The value in following antecedent rules is not best viewed as an end in 
itself. It has no intrinsic value. Following an authoritative rule is valuable only 
when it is an instance of legitimate authority. It is therefore dependent on the 
justification for the authoritative rule. My claim here is not that, when an 
authority is legitimate, there is value in following all of its directives. The 
legitimacy of the authority may be patchy, justifying only some of its directives. 
But provided the authoritative directive is justified as an instance of legitimate 
authority, there is some value in having that rule that is not limited to the values 
that justify the directive’s legitimate authority, such as the authority’s expertise, 
democratic legitimacy, or its ability to coordinate action for the common good. 
                                                 
20 On this distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty, see Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts 
of Liberty’ in his Liberty: Incorporating ‘Four Essays on Liberty’ (Henry Hardy ed, OUP 2002). 
21 cf GA Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (CUP 1995); Ronald Dworkin, Justice 
for Hedgehogs (Belknap Press 2011) ch 17. 
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There is additional value to the extent that the directive lives up to the rule-of-
law requirements of clarity, generality, openness, prospectiveness, and so forth. 
So these requirements have value, but only when we are justified in following 
the authoritative rule. 
This ideal of the rule of law can therefore be stated as follows: if conduct 
ought to be guided by an authoritative legal rule, then that authoritative legal rule 
ought to be capable of guiding conduct. A law that is capable of guiding conduct 
enables the law’s subjects to know where they stand and make decisions 
accordingly, and in that way may be said to promote liberty. Freedom under the 
law, in this sense, is the freedom that comes with the knowability of precise rules 
laid down in advance of the particular circumstances.22 Yet by itself it is 
compatible with laws that (though clear, prospective, general, and so forth) 
impose all-encompassing restrictions on its subjects lives. Freedom may be 
enhanced in other, more important ways: the freedom of not being subject to 
authority at all, or the freedom of being able to challenge authority. 
That is why the ideal of the rule of law entails that if there ought to be 
governmental authority and the authority ought to be followed, it is better, from 
the point of view of promoting freedom, for governmental authority to adhere to 
the requirements of the rule of law. Thus the ideal of the rule of law is premised 
on the notion that there should be fidelity to the law, that the authoritative legal 
rules should be followed. If there should not be fidelity to the law in a 
particularly case—if the reason for following the authoritative rule is defeated—
                                                 
22 See Friedrich A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1960) 166–67; 
TRS Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (OUP 2013) 91. 
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then in that case the rule of law, in the sense of the rule of authority, will not 
have moral value. Fuller presents the officials’ duty of fidelity to the law as itself 
a requirement of the rule of law, or what he calls a desideratum of the inner 
morality of law. He calls this requirement ‘the most complex of all the 
desiderata’. In my view, it is better understood as the underlying justification for, 
rather than merely the eighth desideratum of, the rule of law.23 It is sometimes 
argued that the rule of law requires merely that judges and other officials follow 
the law, and that this duty arises even when the law’s subjects are morally bound 
to follow the law.24 As long as officials obey their duty of fidelity to the law, the 
rule of law is satisfied, so the argument goes, when subjects are capable of 
guiding their conduct, regardless of whether they choose to follow the law or are 
morally required to disobey it. On the other hand, it might be thought that, if the 
law’s subjects are justified in refusing to follow the law, then officials cannot be 
justified in imposing the law on them.25 In any case, whether it imposes more 
onerous requirements on officials than subjects, the core of this ideal of the rule 
of law—its focal meaning—includes both the guidance of conduct and the 
requirement of fidelity to the law. 
 
3. Arbitrariness and the Rule of Authority 
 
                                                 
23 Fuller, The Morality of Law (n 4) 81. 
24 Gardner calls this the ‘asymmetric interpretation’ of the rule of law: Gardner, ‘On the 
Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law’ (n 8) 213. 
25 cf Heidi Hurd, Moral Combat: The Dilemma of Legal Perspectivalism (CUP 1999). 
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When understood as the rule of authority, the ideal of the rule of law is 
necessarily at odds with decisions that are not determined—or at least not guided 
and constrained—by authoritative legal rules. This claim needs some defending, 
for there is a school of thought that suggests that not all arbitrariness is contrary 
to this ideal of the rule of law. There are, it is true, different meanings of 
arbitrariness. Jeremy Waldron has suggested that, in modern jurisprudence, the 
word ‘arbitrary’ has three meanings: ‘unpredictable’, ‘unreasoned’, and ‘without 
authority or legitimacy’.26 These meanings are each slightly different: decisions 
can be unpredictable without being unreasoned, and can be unreasoned without 
being unpredictable; and decisions can lack authority or legitimacy, even though 
they are predictable and reasoned. The different meanings of arbitrariness that 
Waldron discusses may well reflect the various uses of the word ‘arbitrary’ in 
jurisprudence, but it seems to me that the second meaning—‘unreasoned’—is the 
odd one out in this account of the rule of law. This may sound surprising, 
because we tend to think, rightly in my view, that an arbitrary decision is a 
decision that lacks reasoned justification and is a matter of choice, a decision that 
is sometimes said to be reached on the basis of one’s ‘will’ rather than ‘reason’. 
Yet the arbitrariness that the requirements of the rule of law are concerned to 
reduce is the arbitrariness that comes with, not unreasoned decisions, but 
decisions that lack the constraint and predictability of antecedent rules. For 
defenders of this ideal of the rule of law, unreasoned decisions are also arbitrary 
and a cause for concern, but as far as this ideal of the rule of law is concerned, 
                                                 
26 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) 167–68. 
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what matters is that there is the constraint of antecedent rules laid down by 
authority. There will of course be a judgment needed to create the rules, but that 
judgment should, on this account, be made by those in authority, not by those 
whose duty is to apply the authoritative rules. 
Given that the application of rules often calls for moral judgment—either 
to interpret the rules, to fill in the gaps left by vagueness, or to decide whether or 
not to apply the rules—my account of this ideal of the rule of law may seem 
unrealistic. Vagueness in the law seems to make the rule of law in this sense an 
impossible ideal, and, as Timothy Endicott says, ‘[a]n impossible ideal seems 
romantic at best, and at worst absurd.’27 Endicott has provided a more nuanced 
account of the rule of law, according to which vagueness and lack of constraint 
are not necessarily arbitrary in a way that is contrary to the rule of law. 
According to Endicott, we need to distinguish between the different senses of 
arbitrariness and designate one sense of arbitrariness as pejorative and contrary 
to the rule of law. In making this argument, Endicott begins by outlining three 
ordinary senses of arbitrary government—lack of constraint, lack of consistency, 
and lack of certainty—and observes that arbitrary government in each of these 
three senses is often unavoidable. He then reaches the conclusion that there is not 
necessarily anything wrong with arbitrary government in these three senses, that 
they are not necessarily arbitrary in the ordinary, pejorative sense of the term. 
Much of Endicott’s argument here is compelling. Especially due to the 
inevitable vagueness in the law, lack of constraint is often an unavoidable feature 
                                                 
27 Timothy AO Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 OJLS 1, 4. 
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of adjudication. To the extent that we call this lack of constraint ‘arbitrary’, it is 
often relatively innocuous and, in any case, is necessary in the circumstances. 
While the ideal of constraining decision-makers with authoritative rules may 
remain a valid ideal, that ideal loses some of its relevance when there is no rule 
governing the issue to be decided and hence there is no alternative but to, as it 
were, fill in the gaps where the rule runs out. But even in these circumstances, 
the unconstrained judicial choice remains a deficit for this ideal of the rule of law 
as the rule of authority. From the point of view of this ideal, it is a deficit that 
ought to be remedied through the creation of new authoritative rules to avoid this 
unconstrained choice in the future. 
Endicott, however, believes that it is necessary to change our 
interpretation of the rule of law. To retain the ideal of the rule of law, he argues, 
we need a different, pejorative sense of the arbitrary government, which is 
necessarily opposed to the rule of law: ‘Government is arbitrary’, in Endicott’s 
pejorative sense, ‘if its actions depart from the reason of the law.’28 The idea of 
‘the reason of the law’ is puzzling. In explaining it, Endicott refers at one point 
to Raz’s ‘similar sense of arbitrariness’,29 which is Raz’s claim that an exercise 
of power will be arbitrary in a way that departs from the rule of law ‘only if it 
was done either with indifference to whether it will serve the purposes which 
alone can justify use of that power or with belief that it will not serve them’.30 
                                                 
28 ibid, 3. 
29 ibid 8 n 9, citing Raz, The Authority of Law (n 4) 219. 
30 Raz, The Authority of Law (n 4) 219. 
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But this is hardly much clearer. Raz and Endicott’s pejorative senses of 
arbitrariness seem to be intended to convey the association of arbitrariness with 
one’s ‘will’ rather than ‘reason’. As Raz says, this makes arbitrary power 
essentially subjective: ‘It all depends on the state of mind of the men in power’.31 
Here is one of Endicott’s clearest expressions of what he means by the pejorative 
sense of arbitrariness: 
 
By an ‘arbitrary act’ we could simply mean, what the actor 
willingly does, justified (if at all) by the fact that the actor so 
wills, without any (other) justification of reason. … All 
government decisionmaking is arbitrary in that sense. But I want 
to keep the word in its ordinary pejorative sense, so let’s use it to 
refer to an unjustified act, a capricious or despotic act that calls 
for—and lacks—some justification other than the fact that the 
actor willed it and did it (and potentially calls for control by 
another authority than the actor). To sustain this pejorative sense 
it is essential to have criteria for which acts do and do not call for 
the imposition of a justification other than the mere will of the 
actor.32 
 
                                                 
31 ibid. 
32 Timothy Endicott, ‘The Reason of the Law’ (2003) 48 Am J Juris 83, 90. 
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The important point here is that arbitrary decisions will be contrary to the rule of 
law if they ‘call for’, but lack, a justification other than the mere will of the 
decision-maker. Now, surely a decision will call for a justification if we think 
that there is a justification for a particular decision. If that is how we understand 
the rule of law, then a decision may be contrary to the rule of law when it is 
unjustified, when it is contrary to reason. But if that is how we understand the 
rule of law, then it is not the arbitrariness of a choice that is the problem, but the 
fact that it is contrary to reason. Are we really still talking about the same ideal 
of the rule of law? It seems to me that we are talking about a different ideal of 
the rule of law. 
There seems to be an important difference between Raz and Endicott on 
the extent to which the rule of law requires the creation of more determinate 
standards that would avoid judicial choice. For Endicott, ‘we cannot give a 
coherent account of the rule of law as requiring precision, because vagueness 
cannot be eliminated.’33 But while complete precision, eliminating all possible 
indeterminacy, is impossible and undesirable, there are undoubtedly some vague 
laws that should be made more precise. According to Raz, there is a special 
requirement for judges to refrain from making arbitrary choices among 
incommensurable options. When reason runs out, in Raz’s view, the rule of law 
requires ‘distancing devices’, or some ‘artificial system of reasoning which could 
help determine cases where natural reason runs out, thus assuring the public that 
the decisions are no mere expression of personal preference on the part of the 
                                                 
33 Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (n 35) 6. 
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judges.’34 This claim is problematic. The reason why the rule of law is opposed 
to arbitrary judicial choice is not that it is opposed to choices that are 
underdetermined by reason, but that it is opposed to judicial decision-making on 
the basis of a moral judgment as to what reason requires. The rule of law, in this 
sense, requires judicial decisions to be constrained by authoritative rules—even 
though judicial decision-making unconstrained by rules may be necessary in 
many circumstances. On the other hand, when judges are justified in resorting to 
moral judgment, and moral judgment leaves a choice among incommensurable 
options, the resulting choice, though arbitrary, will also be reasonable—and it 
would be odd to require the judge to rely on an artificial form of reasoning to 
conceal the choice being made. But Raz may have a better argument if he is 
understood as saying that the arbitrariness of the choice among 
incommensurables may be one reason for establishing an authoritative rule for 
the future, in order to promote the rule of law and avoid unconstrained judicial 
decision-making. 
But that is only one sense of the rule of law. As I will explain in the 
following section, the rule of law, in another sense, is opposed to unreasoned 
decisions, not when they are underdetermined by reason, but when they are 
contrary to reason. If, against this view, you think that there is only one ideal of 
the rule of law, the one identified in this section as the rule of authority, then you 
                                                 
34 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(Clarendon Press 1994) 339. See also ibid 318: ‘ordinary rule-of-law considerations come into 
play. Only by adhering to one coherent policy can the law be made known and its application 
predictable.’ See also Grégoire Webber, ‘Rights and the Rule of Law in the Balance’ (2013) 129 
LQR 399. 
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may say that we are not talking about an ideal of the rule of law at all. We are 
simply talking about something else. You may well be right. But my point is 
that, if, on the contrary, you want to frame the rule of law as a requirement to 
provide a reasoned justification, then it is important to distinguish that very 
different ideal from the ideal explored in this section. Before explaining why that 
is important, let us explore what that different ideal of the rule of law might look 
like and its implications for arbitrary decision-making. 
 
4. The Rule of Reason 
 
The claim that the rule of law is the rule of reason has a long pedigree. With its 
ancient roots in the Aristotelian notion that ‘[t]he law is reason unaffected by 
desire’,35 this ideal is most often associated with natural law theory, with all the 
distracting controversies that this association entails. But today it continues to 
play an important role. In English administrative law, for example, the term ‘the 
rule of reason’ has its origins in Rooke’s Case, in which Edward Coke stated 
that, notwithstanding the fact that discretion had been conferred by authority, 
discretion ‘ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law.’36 The 
rule of reason has now become associated with the grounds of review that Lord 
Greene summarised in the Wednesbury case,37 which, according to Sir John 
                                                 
35 Aristotle, Politics Book III, 1286, p 78. 
36 Rooke’s Case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b. 
37 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
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Laws, ‘exemplifies the rule of reason as a fundamental principle of the law’.38 
The term ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ is often thought to refer to an extreme 
sense of unreasonableness. The court will not intervene unless the administrative 
decision is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come 
to it’,39 as Lord Greene put it, adding that unreasonableness in this sense ‘is not 
what the court considers unreasonable, a different thing altogether’.40 What Lord 
Greene meant, however, was that the court will not intervene merely because it 
happens to disagree with the decision, when it is a decision on which ‘honest and 
sincere people hold different views.’41 The court will only intervene when it is 
beyond the range of reasonable decisions. This ideal of the rule of reason entails 
a significantly different meaning of government under law. It is concerned not 
with whether decisions are constrained by rules laid down in advance, but with 
whether decisions are reasonable.  
A feature of this ideal of the rule of law that for many theorists would 
count against it is that it seems to be equivalent to the rule of good law. ‘If the 
rule of law is the rule of the good law,’ Joseph Raz warned, ‘then to explain its 
nature is to propound a complete social philosophy.’42 TRS Allan makes a 
                                                 
38 Sir John Laws, ‘Wednesbury’ in Christopher Forsyth and Ivan Hare (eds), The Golden 
Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade 
(Clarendon Press 1998) 186. cf Michael Taggart, ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’ in Nicholas 
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39 Wednesbury (n 45) 230. 
40 ibid 230. 
41 ibid 230. 
42 Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (n 4) 211. 
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similar point, suggesting that a coherent account of the rule of law must enable 
us ‘to agree in criticising governmental action as being contrary to the rule of 
law even when we may disagree about the merits of rival conceptions of 
justice.’43 Yet Allan goes on to offer an account of the rule of law as the rule of 
reason, arguing that ‘[a]t the heart of the ideal of the rule of law, properly 
understood, is a principle requiring governmental action to be rationally justified 
in terms of some conception of the public good.’44 Drawing on a Rawlsian idea 
of public reason, Allan argues that the rule of law does not require any particular 
conception of the good, but it does require justification in terms of some 
conception of the good, provided that it is open to public scrutiny and debate, 
‘appropriate for a pluralistic society’, and capable of being endorsed by 
everyone.45 Moreover, Allan claims that this theory of the rule of law gives a 
special role to the common law, which is thought to seek to identify conceptions 
of the common good and the common reason of the community, consistently 
applied, open to scrutiny, and with the ordinary courts as its ‘exemplar’.46 
This Rawlsian idea of public reason could be interpreted as meaning 
either that the conception of the good offered in justification must be publicly 
acceptable or that it must be generally accepted in society. There is a great 
                                                 
43 Allan, ‘The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason’ (n 3) 221. 
44 ibid 231. 
45 TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (OUP 2001) 289–91. 
46 ibid 291. See also Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise 
of Community (University of California Press 1992) 450. On the idea of the Supreme Court as 
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37. 
 23 
difference, however, between, on the one hand, the public being able to accept a 
justification and, on the other, the justification actually being accepted by most 
of the public. Justifications ought to be publicly acceptable—that is, made with 
an argument that everyone could, in principle, accept, even if people in fact 
disagree—but that is not to say that justifications should be made because they 
are publicly accepted. Justifications should appeal to consensus where possible, 
but it is less obvious that any possible consensus (assuming that one exists) 
should constrain justifications. Justification should be based on individual 
conviction, whether or not that conviction is widely shared. Allan seems to 
acknowledge this point when he says ‘[i]n neither legal reasoning nor political 
argument … is there a sharp division between public reason and personal 
conviction, where legal and moral consensus disappears in the face of intractable 
disagreement.’47 The rule of reason does not depend on any consensus among 
competing moral viewpoints. 
Defending the rule of law as the rule of reason does not entail setting out 
a particular conception of the good. But it does entail the seemingly banal 
conclusion that right reason—what one really ought to do—should triumph. This 
answer, however, has to overcome some significant objections, the most 
important of which is why one’s own convictions about the requirements of 
reason—which, in legal disputes, in effect means the judge’s own convictions—
should rule. The response to this objection is not that the courts are the 
repository of some ‘common reason’, but that judges, like everyone else, ought 
                                                 
47 Allan, Constitutional Justice (n 53) 290. 
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to decide what the right thing to do is on the basis of their own convictions. The 
idea that it is one’s own convictions that should determine the extent of one’s 
obligations has been endorsed by a wide range of legal philosophers. From 
Dworkin’s ‘protestant’ approach to legal obligation, according to which we each 
have a responsibility to work out the best moral interpretation of the law,48 to 
Raz’s observation that judges are human beings and, like everyone else, must act 
morally above all else, regardless of what the law says,49 there is general 
agreement among legal philosophers that judges should rely on their own 
convictions of what the right thing to do is when deciding cases. Of course, that 
does not mean that judges should ignore the decisions of others. The morally 
right thing to do might be to defer to the decision of a legitimate authority, even 
though one would otherwise, in the absence of that decision, have reached a 
different conclusion about what the right thing to do is.  
In the context of the ideal of the rule of law, let us recall Endicott’s 
suggestion that, instead of requiring conformity with right reason, the rule of law 
is a requirement to act in accordance with ‘the reason of the law’. According to 
Endicott, the ideal of the rule of law is achieved when the law controls what it 
ought to control, what it is good at regulating, a question that he acknowledges 
requires a moral judgment.50 And yet, on his account, ‘it still makes sense to 
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distinguish between the rule of law and the rule of good law.’51 It makes sense 
because, for Endicott, the relevant moral judgment is taken to be a judgment 
‘from the legal point of view’, restricted by ‘the general principles of the law of a 
community’—which is what he means by the reason of the law.52 Thus a 
decision will be arbitrary in the pejorative sense when the decision is 
inconsistent with the principles of the law, with the reason of the law. But the 
reason of the law can be, from one’s own moral point of view, ‘more or less 
reasonable but also more or less unreasonable’.53 And so, on Endicott’s account, 
although the content of the rule of law requires a moral judgment, the decisions 
that the rule of law treats as arbitrary—that is, in his special pejorative sense of 
contrary to the reason of the law—might not be the same as the decisions that 
one’s own moral judgment treats as contrary to reason. 
This is not, in my view, the best way to understand the rule of reason. If 
there is indeed an ideal of the rule of law as the rule of reason, it is best 
understood as the rule of reason in the sense of our own judgment about what is 
in accordance with right reason. It is possible to recognise this as an ideal of the 
rule of law and nonetheless maintain a distinction between the rule of law and 
the rule of good law. There may be a content-independent justification to follow 
an authoritative legal rule even though the content of the legal rule is morally 
deficient in some way. But if the rule of reason is a distinct ideal of the rule of 
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law, then it must entail that sometimes judges should decide cases on the basis of 
what is in accordance with right reason, even if to do so conflicts with what the 
authoritative legal rule says.  
You may say that reason should rule in adjudication anyway, regardless 
of whether this requirement can be described as an ideal of the rule of law. That 
was Raz’s view and he was right. It might even be questioned whether there is 
something misleading about describing the rule of reason as the rule of law. But 
addressing this claim would take us too far into intricate debates in legal 
philosophy that are outside the scope of this article. Moreover, it is not clear that 
the question of which considerations relevant to judicial decision-making we call 
‘law’ is as important as some legal philosophers believe. As long as we are clear 
about when judges are applying authoritative rules laid down in advance and 
when they are applying their own standards of reasonableness, does it really 
matter which premises in judicial reasoning we call law?54 Without wishing to 
answer these questions here, my point in this section is simply that, if the rule of 
law can be understood as the rule of reason, then, on the most satisfactory 
account, it is the rule of our judgment about what right reason requires. This 
judgment includes content-independent reasons for following authority as well 
as content-dependent reasons that go to the substance of the decision. The rule of 
reason will usually, but not always, require the rule of authority. 
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5. Arbitrariness and the Rule of Reason 
 
The rule of reason has a distinct relationship to arbitrariness. Arbitrariness may 
be incompatible with the ideal of the rule of authority, even though it is 
compatible with the rule of reason. A decision is arbitrary if it lacks reason, but 
an arbitrary decision is not necessarily contrary to reason. A choice between 
incommensurable options is an example of an arbitrary decision that lacks reason 
but is not contrary to reason—that is, the choice is arbitrary because there is no 
conclusive reason for one option over the other, but it is not contrary to reason 
because there is an undefeated reason for each of the options. 
The idea that reason can require a judge to make an arbitrary choice 
between incommensurables is also emphasised in Endicott’s account of the rule 
of law. ‘Resolution is a basic requirement of the rule of law,’ he writes. ‘It is 
important when it is indeterminate what justice or the law requires, and when the 
various incommensurable requirements of good judicial decision-making conflict 
with each other, and even when there is no just outcome’.55 Endicott seems to 
suggest that resolution is a general requirement, but I am not sure whether that is 
what he intended to suggest.56 For there may be some issues that should be left 
unresolved in judicial disputes, perhaps because those issues are better resolved 
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by other people.57 But Endicott also writes that the need for resolution in judicial 
disputes is a special responsibility of judges, because ‘the need for resolution 
never overrides the need for justice and the need for legality.’58 This is far from 
clear, however, as Endicott himself acknowledges when he writes that ‘it seems 
as if legality and justice do not matter’ in cases in which there is ‘no legal or 
moral reason to choose one resolution rather than another’.59 Nonetheless, judges 
are often required by reason to resolve disputes between incommensurable 
options.60 In doing so, they inevitably act arbitrarily, but not in a way that causes 
a problem for the rule of law in the sense of the rule of reason.61 Only if the 
reasons that apply to the judge also call for an authoritative legal rule—even 
though no such rule may currently exist—will the arbitrary choice be contrary to 
the rule of law, in the sense of the rule of authority. 
The compatibility between arbitrariness and the rule of reason suggests 
that, if two options really are incommensurable, then it may not be contrary to 
the rule of reason for the judge to choose between them by flipping a coin. As we 
shall see, there is a reason for judges to avoid flipping coins; however, perhaps 
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surprisingly, I do not think that the reason is because of an inherent injustice in 
flipping coins to decide legal disputes. It is not as easy as it might intuitively 
seem to find anything wrong with a judge, faced with a dispute between 
incommensurable options, using the quintessentially impartial device of flipping 
a coin.62 Indeed, a coin flip or something similar would have the merit of 
explicitly acknowledging the lack of justification.63 Endicott argues that the 
following is a conclusive reason against judges flipping coins in these situations: 
‘a need for judicial discipline … a discipline against corruption and prejudice 
and wilfulness’.64 This is not entirely convincing, however, for surely flipping a 
coin would sometimes be quite a good way of preventing corruption, prejudice, 
and wilfulness. Yet there is a reason against flipping coins, which may well be 
conclusive. The risk is that a judge might adopt this approach even when the 
options are commensurable and the decision is determined by reason. Indeed, 
there have been instances in which judges, and juries, have done just that.65 
While our unease with judges flipping coins is most often explained by pointing 
to our dislike of decisions being made randomly or irrationally,66 some degree of 
irrationality is unavoidable in circumstances where there are incommensurable 
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options. It is only reasonable to resist the practice of flipping coins in such 
circumstances because the practice may spill over into other circumstances. 
When making a choice between incommensurable options, judges act in 
the way that any other decision maker would act. According to HLA Hart, there 
are ‘characteristic judicial virtues’ that can distinguish judicial decision making 
from the kind of choice exercised by legislatures, such as ‘impartiality and 
neutrality in surveying the alternatives; consideration for the interest of all who 
will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle as a 
reasoned basis for decision’.67 Not only are these not distinctively judicial 
characteristics, but also it is not clear how these virtues are supposed to assist the 
judge when choosing between incommensurable options. While Hart 
acknowledges that morality might not provide a right answer when legal sources 
fail to determine the outcome, he insists that judges may be able to make an 
impartial choice through ‘the “weighing” and “balancing” characteristic of the 
effort to do justice between competing interests.’68 It is true that judicial 
reasoning will often be different from other types of reasoning, because judges 
have to contend with certain moral duties, such as the defeasible obligation to 
apply the authoritative legal rules, which do not apply, or do not apply with 
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equal force, to other decision makers, especially in the legislature. When the 
legal sources are indeterminate, judges may face a choice that is, in essence, the 
same as a legislator’s choice. The same is true when the requirements of reason 
conflict incommensurably. 
You might think that when one of the reasons that conflicts 
incommensurably is the reason for applying an existing legal rule, then certain 
constitutive features of the judicial role make this choice different from other 
kinds of choices, because the judicial role is, by its very nature, about applying 
legal rules laid down in advance. Judges, on this view, should only depart from 
existing standards when they are defeated by reason, not simply when there are 
(otherwise) undefeated reasons in favour of another option. But it seems to me 
that the reasons for and against following authoritative rules may be 
incommensurable, even for judges.69 Though the reasons that judges must 
contend with may differ a legislator’s reasons, the way in which reasons must be 
assessed does not. 
 
6. The Plurality of the Ideals 
 
Although many others have drawn attention to the two sides of the rule of law, 
the conventional wisdom is that the two sides can always be reconciled. ‘Though 
the two conceptions compete as ideals of the legal process (because … they 
recommend different theories of adjudication),’ Dworkin writes, ‘they are 
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nevertheless compatible as more general ideals for a just society.’70 Most 
theorists who draw attention to the two aspects of the rule of law argue that the 
ideal is an interpretative enterprise along the lines of Dworkin’s conception of 
law as integrity. They tend to argue that the rule of law aims ‘at coherence and 
consistency’,71 and that ‘with sensitivity to context’ its competing values may be 
resolved in a way that eliminates any conflict.72 On this account, conflicts can be 
resolved by reasons implicit in the corpus of common law and statute, so that 
‘[t]he judge has no discretion, in the sense of scope for exercising will or 
choice’.73 This is thought to provide a distinctively judicial standard of 
impartiality, to which, according to Allan, other officials should adhere as 
closely as possible: an official’s decision ‘must be not only authorized, falling 
within the scope of its jurisdiction, but fair and reasonable.’74 But the problem 
with this account is that it pays insufficient attention to situations in which an 
official’s decision is authorised but not otherwise fair and reasonable, or in 
which an official’s decision is fair and reasonable but not authorised. 
I am not suggesting that the two ideals of the rule of law are never 
reconcilable. As I explained at the outset, the rule of reason is the ultimate ideal 
because, in most contexts, it requires judges to apply authoritative legal rules. In 
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these contexts, the two ideals are harmonious, forming a consistent whole. But 
there is a danger in drawing the conclusion that, as Sir John Laws says, ‘the rule 
of reasonableness is the condition of all legality’: 
 
[T]he voice that says public authority must obey the statute insists 
in the same breath that public authority has to bring a reasonable 
mind to bear upon its duties. There is in the end no distinction 
between these imperatives. To acknowledge the limits of one’s 
power set by Parliament is to bring a reasonable mind to bear 
upon its exercise.75 
 
Although we should acknowledge that the rule of authority is an ideal only to the 
extent that it is reasonable for the authority to rule, we should also acknowledge 
the distinctiveness of, and the possibility of conflict between, the two ideals. The 
rule of reason can sometimes require the rule of authority, but there are other 
requirements of reason and these can conflict with the requirement to follow 
authority. We should not be duped into thinking that the rule of reason can 
control the interpretation of authority so that the two ideals of the rule of law do 
not really conflict. 
Once we understand that the two ideals are distinct, it is not difficult to 
see that a lack of conformity with the ideal of the rule of law as the rule of 
authority, though a matter for some regret, may be a good thing, all things 
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considered. The rule of law, as Raz puts it, ‘has always to be balanced against 
competing claims of other values. … Conformity to the rule of law is a matter of 
degree, and though, other things being equal, the greater the conformity the 
better—other things are rarely equal.’76 Fuller makes a similar point when he 
says that one of the most obvious demands of the rule of law—the demand ‘that 
a rule passed today should govern what happens tomorrow, not what happened 
yesterday’—can sometimes conflict with other values and, if treated as absolute, 
would ‘disserve the cause of legality.’77 Opponents of judicial activism have 
sought to use this account of the rule of law as the rule of authority to argue 
against the inevitable increase in judicial power and ad hocism that comes with 
vague criteria such as doctrines of reasonableness and proportionality.78 But 
Fuller rightly saw the problem of judicial empowerment as one of degree: his 
main concern—what he described as the first route to disaster for a system of 
law—was ‘a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on 
an ad hoc basis’.79 He understood that a ‘utopia’ of legality, in which his eight 
desiderata are perfectly satisfied, ‘is not actually a useful target for guiding the 
impulse toward legality’.80  
This sensible, pluralistic approach to the rule of law is not something that 
depends on restricting the rule of law to the rule of authority. That said, I think it 
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is striking, though you may say not especially surprising, that most proponents of 
the rule of reason as an ideal of the rule of law have been theorists who insist on 
the unity of value. Against the sensible view of Raz and Fuller, exponents of a 
unified approach to the rule of law find the idea of choosing between the rule of 
law and other values ‘bewildering’, arguing that ‘the ideal of the rule of law 
precludes making any sacrifices of it.’81 This is not merely an overvaluation of 
the rule of law. It betrays a profound misunderstanding of the nature of the ideal. 
From the sound insight that the rule of law is more than the requirements 
necessary for the rule of authority, these theorists adopt an overly interpretative 
approach that seeks coherence among the different meanings of the rule of law. 
The resulting unity, in their eyes, entails that the officials’ duty of fidelity to law 
is almost absolute, with the law being interpreted in a way that, as far as 
possible, is in accordance with morality. 
This unifying approach to the rule of law can be seen in an essay on the 
rule of law by Michael Oakeshott, in which he drew attention to two sides of the 
rule of law: the side that emphasises formal requirements of ‘authenticity’ (‘lex’) 
and the side that emphasises substantive requirements of ‘rightness’ (‘jus’). 
Oakeshott conflated these two sides, arguing that they could be unified by the 
notion of rendering justice according to law (the ‘jus of lex’). The substantive 
requirements of rightness, he says, are determined by arguing about the meaning 
of an authoritative legal rule in respect of its application in a particular case, not 
                                                 
81 David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Legitimacy of the Rule of Law’ in David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt, 
and Grant Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart 
(Hart Publishing 2009) 40, 42. 
 36 
by considering what is in the public interest or what is right.82 Oakeshott says 
that the jus of lex is not merely a matter of faithfulness to the formal character of 
law, but also invokes ‘the negative and limited consideration that the 
prescriptions of the law should not conflict with a prevailing educated moral 
sensibility’ capable of determining the kind of conditions that should be imposed 
by law.83 But although jus and lex are to be distinguished, the rule of law on this 
account is about the rule of lex and about the jus inherent in lex, not about the 
rule of jus in the sense of the rule of reason that I set out in the previous 
section.84 
One particularly striking feature of some unifying accounts of the rule of 
law is the suggestion that judges should not change the law. While most theorists 
who make this claim accept that judges often make political judgments when 
interpreting the law, they argue that, in doing so, judges do not (or at least should 
not) make decisions that are inconsistent with the law laid down in advance. 
Nigel Simmonds makes a particularly strong version of this argument when he 
argues that judges cannot have a power to modify the law, because if they did, 
the ‘rule-as-modified’ would be ‘applied in the very case that gave rise to the 
modification, so that all such cases would have to be regarded as the most 
serious departures from the rule of law.’85 When judges conform to the rule of 
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reason and apply standards not found in the authoritative sources, the unifying 
account seeks to hold judges to the same requirements as those associated with 
the ideal of the rule of authority and freedom under the law. ‘If legality is related 
to the idea of freedom as independence,’ Allan writes, ‘we must suppose that the 
content of common law rules is, in principle, knowable in advance of action that 
might infringe them: we should not have to await retrospective judicial 
pronouncement.’86 For Allan, the requirement of knowability can be satisfied 
because, although a court’s justification for its decision may at times be 
politically contentious, the rule of reason can be based on shared criteria of 
justice.87 
There is much at stake in disputes over the meaning of the rule of law. 
What is at stake is nothing less—and quite a lot more—than the questions of 
how judges should decide cases, of how to understand what judges do when they 
decide cases, and of the implications of value pluralism for judicial reasoning 
and decision-making. But it would be a mistake to think that one could not have 
a sound understanding of adjudication if one thought that the rule of reason 
should not be included within the meaning of the rule of law. This is a mistake 
that Dworkin made when he wrote, somewhat confusingly, that ‘[t]hough the 
two conceptions [of the rule of law], as general political ideals, may both have a 
place in a full political theory, it makes a great difference which is taken to be 
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the ideal of law because it is that ideal which governs our attitudes about 
adjudication.’88 The main problem with Dworkin’s account is that, in 
distinguishing between the ‘rule-book’ and the ‘rights’ conceptions of the rule of 
law, he treated these ideals as alternative ways of viewing the ideal of the rule of 
law. Only those who adopt the latter conception, he argued, are capable of 
accepting that the courts should enforce the moral rights that the parties actually 
have. Arguing that we should reject the rule-book conception, Dworkin 
acknowledged that the rules laid down in advance exert an influence on the 
question of what moral rights the parties have.89 But that influence, he 
maintained, does not give rise to a conflict with other principles: rather, it frames 
the moral rights that the parties have, so that any moral principles that are 
inconsistent with the rule book have no place in adjudication.90 For Dworkin and 
other like-minded theorists, then, the requirements of the rule of law are unified 
and harmonious with one another. 
This argument is not surprising when it comes from those who reject the 
incommensurability thesis. But more surprising is the apparent assumption of 
commensurability in the writings on the rule of law of some theorists who accept 
the incommensurability thesis. I think that Raz, for example, made such an 
assumption, despite his explicit intention to expound an account of the rule of 
law appropriate for a pluralistic society. In an essay entitled ‘The Politics of the 
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Rule of Law’, Raz made a slight shift towards embracing something like the rule 
of reason as an ideal of the rule of law, arguing that the rule of law sets limits on 
the will of the legislature: ‘It requires principled, as well as faithful, 
adjudication.’91 That much I think is right. But Raz then appears to make two 
contradictory arguments: on the one hand, he criticises the idea of common law 
reason, arguing that it gives too much power to the common law courts and is 
therefore not suitable for a pluralistic society; on the other hand, he argues that 
the principled adjudication that the rule of law requires is based on the ‘common 
values and shared practices of the legal culture’.92 Raz insists that these 
arguments are not contradictory, because the common legal culture is shaped by 
legislation as much as by judicial practices. However, he goes on to say that ‘the 
function of the rule of law is to facilitate the integration of particular pieces of 
legislation with the underlying doctrines of the legal system.’93 
The assumption of commensurability in the ideals of the rule of law 
among those who accept the incommensurability thesis can also be seen in 
Endicott’s account of the rule of law. He argues that, although the rule of law 
may seem to require precision, ‘we cannot give a coherent account of the rule of 
law as requiring precision, because vagueness cannot be eliminated.’94 Endicott’s 
argument here is that some norms, such as the prohibition on torture, cannot be 
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made more precise without defeating the purpose of having those norms. A norm 
that stated precisely what does and does not constitute torture would be useless, 
the argument goes, because it would be unable to cope appropriately with the 
complexity of the situation and people ‘could not take it as a guide for their 
conduct—so it would be no advance towards the rule of law.’95 The 
attractiveness of this argument is attributable not only to the belief that a precise 
rule is impossible, that vagueness is inevitable, and that therefore we ought not 
to have impossible ideals. It is also attributable to the belief that precise rules, 
even when they are possible, are often over-inclusive and under-inclusive, and in 
this way the increase in precision in the law can often lead to an increase in 
arbitrariness. For Endicott, this arbitrariness is pejorative, going against the 
reason of the law.96 Even if it is not arbitrariness that is the problem, there seems 
to be a problem with precise rules stemming from our revulsion to what Oliver 
Wendell Holmes described as the ‘bad man’, who wants a precise definition of 
torture so that he knows precisely what he can get away with, without actually 
crossing the line.97 These problems with precise rules lend support to the idea 
that, when we want reason and not authoritative legal rules to rule, we do not 
compromise the ideal of the rule of law. 
But what I think Endicott does not adequately acknowledge is the 
possibility that, although we may not compromise the rule of law in the sense of 
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the rule of reason, we do compromise the rule of law (perhaps justifiably in the 
case of defining torture) in the sense of the rule of authority. Even in the example 
of prohibiting torture it is possible to think of opposing values at stake in the 
question of how precise the standard ought to be.98 The arbitrariness of precise 
laws may well be a loss for the rule of reason, but precise laws are a gain for the 
rule of authority. The reverse is also true: the arbitrariness of vague standards is a 
loss for the rule of authority, but vague standards may be a gain for the rule of 
reason. Often the gain in one will outweigh the loss in the other, but we should 
not rule out a priori the possibility that the two options may be incommensurable 
in some contexts. 
In recognising two different ideals of the rule of law, then, we can see 
that they not only have different implications for arbitrariness, but also may 
conflict with one another in other ways: one ideal demands determinate and 
authoritative legal rules that have a high degree of certainty to their application 
in particular circumstances; the other ideal is more concerned with whether the 
decision in the particular circumstances is in accordance with right reason. If we 
bracket the jurisprudential debate about whether law can include things other 
than authoritative sources, then you could accept the main arguments of this 
article and yet believe that the rule of authority is the only ideal of the rule of 
law. But as soon as you start to talk about the rule of law along the lines of the 
rule of reason, it is important not to lose sight of the plurality of, and conflict 
between, the ideals that go to make up the rule of law. The rule of law may not 
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be, as some suggest, ‘an impossible ideal’.99 But it is a complex cluster of ideals, 
which are often irreconcilable. 
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